Abstract. This paper deals with the security of MISTY structure with SPN round function. We study the lower bound of the number of active s-boxes for differential and linear characteristics of such block cipher construction. Previous result shows that the differential bound is consistent with the case of Feistel structure with SPN round function, yet the situation changes when considering the linear bound. We carefully revisit such issue, and prove that the same bound in fact could be obtained for linear characteristic. This result combined with the previous one thus demonstrates a similar practical secure level for both Feistel and MISTY structures. Besides, we also discuss the resistance of MISTY structure with SPN round function against other kinds of cryptanalytic approaches including the integral cryptanalysis and impossible differential cryptanalysis. We confirm the existence of 6-round integral distinguishers when the linear transformation of the round function employs a binary matrix (i.e., the element in the matrix is either 0 or 1), and briefly describe how to characterize 5/6/7-round impossible differentials through the matrix-based method.
Introduction

Backgrounds
Differential cryptanalysis [7] (DC) and linear cryptanalysis [27] (LC) are the two most powerful known attacks on block ciphers. Accordingly, for a new proposed algorithm, the designers should evaluate its security against DC and LC, or even prove its resistance against these two attacks. In general, there are two strategies for achieving this goal. The first one is the provable secure approach, and the second one is the practical secure approach. The provable secure approach 1 is introduced in [32, 31] , where the concepts of differential [23] and linear hull [31] are used to prove an upper bound of maximum differential (linear) probability. This bound should be sufficiently low in order to make the whole cipher be theoretically invulnerable to DC and LC. This condition is usually achieved by imposing a (relative hard) restriction on the round function. Another approach is the practical secure approach [19] , which concentrates on the differential characteristic and linear characteristics, other than the differential and linear hull. According to this approach, if the upper bound of the maximum differential and linear characteristic probabilities are less than (usually) the security threshold, the whole cipher is said to be practically secure against DC and LC.
High-level structures play an essential role in designing block ciphers resisting DC and LC. There are many well-known block cipher structures, including SPN structure, Feistel structure, MISTY structure, Lai-Massey structure, etc. Since most of these block cipher structures can provide their provable security proofs against DC and LC based on some assumptions of the round function, choosing which kind of round function becomes a key step in the design of a secure block cipher. SPN-type round functions attract more attentions in recent years, since they can provide good performance, and meanwhile without lost of security. Many block ciphers, such as Camellia, CLEFIA, SMS4, etc. adopt such kind of round functions.
Related Works
Both provable and practical approaches have been widely adopted to demonstrate the security of various block cipher structures. For instance, using the idea of provable security, the upper bound of differential and linear hull probabilities for Feiste structure are obtained in [2, 32, 31] , and the result for SPN structure are shown in [15, 16, 33] . While using the notation of practical security, the upper bound of probabilities of differential and linear characteristic of Feistel ciphers are obtained in [19] .
It is believed that for most block cipher structures, if the round function is SPN-type, the maximum probability of differential and linear characteristic can usually be converted to the least number of active differential and linear s-boxes. Thus when considering the practical security aspects, the method of counting (or providing the lower bound of) the number of active s-boxes becomes a well used technique. For SPN structure, this approach had been formalized as the wide trail strategy [10] , which is widely used in many block cipher designs [11, 12, 34] . For Feistel structure with SPN round function, a similar result is obtained by Kanda in [22] , followed by some advanced results using the technique of diffusion switching mechanism to avoid the difference cancellation as shown in [36] [37] [38] . Recently, many results are also obtained for generalized Feistel structureswith SPN round function, see e.g. [8, 42, 35, 39] .
MISTY structure is another well-known block cipher structure that is introduced by Matsui in [29] and is recommended as an alternative scheme of Feistel structure, due to its provable security against DC and LC. In [13] , Gilbert and Minier formalize the standard MISTY structure as the L-scheme and refer the dual structure as the R-scheme and provide the proof of (super) pseudorandomness. Another advantage of MISTY structure is that it allow parallel computations in the encryption direction. Due to this, MISTY structure has been chosen as the underlying high-level structure of the block cipher MISTY2 [30] , and meanwhile, as the basic low-level structure of the round function and the component in block ciphers MISTY1 [30] , MISTY2, and KASUMI [40] .
Main Results and Outline of This Paper
This paper mainly concentrates the practical security of MISTY structure when the round function is SPN-type. Let B d (resp. B l ) be the differential (resp. linear) branch number of the linear transformation. Previous result [44] shows that the number of differential active s-boxes in 4r rounds is at least B d × r + ⌊r/2⌋. This lower bound for differential characteristic is consistent with the case of Feistel structure with SPN round function [22] . However, as the authors mentioned, the situation changes when considering the linear characteristic.
We carefully revisit such issue, and prove that the same bound in fact could be obtained for linear characteristic. That is to say the number of active s-boxes in any linear characteristic over 4r rounds is at least B l × r + ⌊r/2⌋. This result combined with the previous one thus demonstrate a similar practical secure level for both Feistel and MISTY structures. Besides, we also discuss the resistance of MISTY structure with SPN round function against other kinds of cryptanalytic approaches including the integral cryptanalysis and the impossible differential cryptanalysis. We confirm the existence of 6-round integral distinguishers when the linear transformation of the round function employs a binary matrix, and briefly describe how to characterize 5/6/7-round impossible differentials through the matrix-based method.
All of the above results can be applied to the block cipher p-Camellia that is proposed in [44] . For instance, the least number of active s-boxes for 16-round linear characteristic can be improved from 15 to 22, which demonstrates the practical resistance of p-Camellia against LC. Meanwhile, 6/7-round integral distinguishers and 5/6/7-round impossible differentials can be constructed (previous known results are only 4-round), which significantly improve the distinguishing bounds of p-Camellia (See Appendix A).
The outline of this paper is as follows: some preliminaries are introduced in Section 2. Section 3 revisits the practical security of MISTY structure with SPN round function against DC and LC. Section 4 discusses the resistance of such block cipher construction against other kinds of cryptanalytic approaches including the integral cryptanalysis and impossible differential cryptanalysis. Finally, Section 5 concludes this paper. 
Preliminaries
Notations
Let X = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ), Y = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n ) ∈ F
MISTY Structure
Consider any block cipher that employs a MISTY structure (see Fig.1 ). Let (X i−1 , X i ) be the input of the i-th round, then the output is (X i , X i+1 ) satisfying
where F (·, ·) is the round function and K i is the round key. In order to make MISTY structure invertible, for any fixed round key K i , F (·, K i ) must be bijective. Assume the plaintext is (X 0 , X 1 ), then after iterating the above round transformation r times, the ciphertext is defined as (X r+1 , X r ). In this paper, we focus on MISTY structure with SPN round function, that is F (X, K) = P (S(X ⊕ K)), where the input X is first XORed with the round key K known as the round key addition layer, and then the result is fed into a substitution layer defined as a non-linear bijective transformation S over F n 2 d by n parallel S-boxs on F 2 d , followed by a diffusion layer which employs an invertible linear transformation P defined over F n×n 2 d . More precisely,
In the following sections, we will use X i−1 (resp. Y i−1 ) to denote the input (resp. output) of the i-th round function, i.e. 
It is worth noting that we will neglect the effect of the round key addition layer when considering the provable or practical security evaluation of block ciphers, since in these situations we assume that the round-key consists of independent and uniform random bits and is bitwise XORed with the data, i.e. Y = F (X ⊕ K) . = F (X) = P (S(X)). One can discriminate those situations according to the context.
Definitions
In this subsection, we give some definitions used in the following sections. 
Definition 2.
The maximum differential and linear probability of s-boxes are defined as: 
then the bundle weight of X is defined by
For convenience, given a linear transformation P :
, we will simply use P to denote its matrix representation and P T to denote the transpose of P . Then the differential/linear branch number [9, 12] is defined as follows:
Definition 5. The differential branch number of P is defined as
B d = min ∆X̸ =0 (H w (∆X) + H w (P · ∆X)) .
Definition 6. The linear branch number of P is defined as
B l = min Γ Y ̸ =0 (H w (Γ Y ) + H w (P T · Γ Y )).
Practical Security Evaluation Against DC and LC
To evaluate the practical security of Feistel ciphers with SPN round function against DC and LC, Kanda presents the following result, which implies that clarifying the upper bound of the maximum differential (resp. linear) characteristic probability is equivalent to showing the lower bound of minimum number of differential (resp. linear) active s-boxes. In general 2 , this result can be applied to many other kinds of block cipher constructions. 
Kanda also demonstrates that for Feistel ciphers with SPN round function, if the linear transformation is bijective, the cipher can be transformed into a Feistel cipher with PSN round function. Thus, according to the duality [5, 28] between DC and LC of Feistel structure, one only needs to give the lower bound of the number of active s-boxes for differential characteristic.
However, Kanda's approach cannot be extended to the case of MISTY structure with SPN round function due to the fact that MISTY structure and its dual structure is not the same. Thus we must study the lower bound of minimum number of active s-boxes for differential and linear characteristics respectively. For convenience, we will still use D (r) and L (r) to represent be the minimum number of differential and linear active s-boxes over r-round MISTY structure with SPN round function.
Lower Bound of the Number of Differential Active S-boxes
In this subsection, we just list the result for the lower bound of then number of differential active s-boxes over 4r-round MISTY structure with SPN round function. Remind that in [44], MISTY structure is referred as 2-cell GF-NLFSR.
Proposition 2. [44] The minimum number of differential active s-boxes for 4r-round 2-cell GF-NLFSR cipher with SPN round function satisfies
Note that this differential bound is consistent with the case of Feistel structure with SPN round function.
Lower Bound of the Number of Linear Active S-boxes
In this subsection, we revisit the practical security of MISTY structure with SPN round function against LC. Previous result 4 only gives a lower bound of the number of linear active s-boxes for some consecutive rounds when B l = 5, and the bound is far from tight. We present a new bound for the general case by carefully studying the relationship of the mask values between different rounds.
To this end, the propagation rule of the mask value should be investigated. As discussed in [5, 28] , for Feistel structure, there exists a duality between differential characteristic and linear characteristic. For MISTY structure, this duality can be described as shown in Fig. 2 . Thus, for differential characteristic, we have
Note that for MISTY structure with SPN round function, the minimum number of linear active s-boxes over r-round is defined by
We first present the following lemma. 
Proof. Let Z i−1 be the intermediate value after the substitution layer in the i-th round and
To further facilitate our proof, we introduce the following useful definition. 
Lemma 2. The minimum number of linear active s-boxes in any three consecutive rounds satisfies
Proof. Without loss of generality, let's consider the first three rounds. We can divide the minimum number of linear active s-boxes into 2 3 − 1 = 7 cases (the trivial (all zero) pattern is out of considering) according to the patterns of the output mask values. 
it is an impossible pattern, thus we only need to consider 7 − 3 = 4 possible patterns, whose corresponding linear bounds are listed in Table 1 . The details are explained as follows:
If (a 0 , a 1 , a 2 ) = (1, 1, 1), according to Lemma 1,
Lemma 3. The minimum number of linear active s-boxes in any four consecutive rounds satisfies
Proof. Similarly, let's consider the first four rounds. Now that any three consecutive round has only 4 possible patterns, thus in total we need only to study 4 × 2 = 8 possible patterns by adding one round after the first three rounds, among which two patterns (1, 0, 1, 0) and (1, 1, 0, 0) are impossible, due to the impossibility of the sub-patterns (0, 1, 0) and (1, 0, 0). For those 8 − 2 = 6 possible patterns, the corresponding bounds are listed in Table 2 . In fact, these bounds can be directly obtained based on the 3-round case.
( (a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ) = (1, 1, 1, 0 (a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ) = (1, 1, 1, 1 (a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ) = (1, 1, 0, 1 
Using a similar technique as shown in Lemma 3, we can obtain the minimum number of linear active s-boxes in any six consecutive rounds. Table 3 . The minimum number of linear active s-boxes in 6-round (a0, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5) minimum number of linear active s-boxes
Lemma 4. The minimum number of linear active s-boxes in any six consecutive rounds satisfies
Proof. The six-round encryption can be treated as a concatenation of two three-round encryptions, thus we have to consider 4×4 = 16 cases, among which three patterns (1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1), (1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1) and (1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1) are impossible, due to the impossible sub-patterns (0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0) and (0, 1, 0). The bounds for the other 13 patterns are listed in Table 3 , based on which one can deduce that
Lemma 5. The minimum number of linear active s-boxes in any eight consecutive rounds satisfies
Proof. From Table 2 , L (4) ≥ B l if and only if the corresponding pattern
And in the other cases, L (4) ≥ B l + 1. Let's discuss how the above two patterns can be concatenated to form a 8-round pattern. The process can be divided into the following four cases:
(1) (a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a 7 ) = (0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0) = (0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0) . This is an impossible pattern since the sub-pattern (1, 0, 0) is impossible. (2) (a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a 7 ) = (0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0) = (0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0) .
In this situation, L
1 ≥ L
1 + L
1 + 1 ≥ 2 × B l + 1. (3) (a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a 7 ) = (1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0) = (1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0) . (4) (a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a 7 ) = (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0) = (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0) . This is an impossible pattern since the sub-pattern (1, 0, 0) is impossible. Proof. The lower bound of the linear active s-boxes in any twelve consecutive rounds can be deduced as follow: 
Resistance to Other Attacks
There are several cryptanalytic approaches that should be considered other than DC and LC when designing a secure block cipher. In this section, we discuss the resistance of MISTY structure with SPN round function against integral cryptanalysis [21] and impossible differential cryptanalysis [6, 20] . We confirm the existence of 6-round integral distinguishers when the linear transformation of the round function employs binary matrix, and describe how to characterize 5/6/7-round impossible differentials through the matrix-based method [17, 18, 24, 26, 43 ].
Notations and Known Results
In the following subsections, for convenience, we will denote MISTY structure with SPN round function as introduced in Section 2 by E, the diffusion matrix of E by P = (p i,j ) n×n and its inversion by P −1 = (q i,j ) n×n . We will also use P j to represent the j-th column vector of P , and
to represent the i-th row vector of P .
Notations for Integral Distinguisher
is balanced, if the bit-wise XOR-sum of all elements of the set is 0, that is
i=0 a i = 0. We use A to denote a active set, C to denote a passive or constant set, and B to denote a balanced set. Sometimes we will use the letter "D" to represent an unknown word, but with the property that all D's have the same value in the distinguisher.
Notations for Impossible Differential
For MISTY structure, we will use (α 1 , α 2 ) → (β 1 , β 2 ) to denote a possible differential, where (α 1 , α 2 ) (resp. (β 1 , β 2 )) is the input (resp. output) difference, and use (α 1 , α 2 ) (β 1 , β 2 ) to represent an impossible differential.
Known Results
Due to the bijective property of the round function, for any block cipher with MISTY structure, there always exists a 4-round impossible differential (α, 0) (β, β), where α, β ∈ F n 2 d be any non-zero values and 5-round integral distinguisher (A, C) → (B, ?), where A, B, and C denote an active state, a balanced state, and a passive state [21] . The question mark ? denotes an unknown state, i.e. the sum of values at this position couldn't be predicted.
Integral Distinguishers
Let's further consider the block cipher E with additional property that the diffusion layer employs a binary invertible matrix P ∈ F n×n 2 . The main result of this subsection is to confirm the existence of 6-round integral distinguishers for such a kind of block cipher.
A Simple Notation
To describe these distinguishers more clearly, we simplify the notations for "balanced" and "unknown" states. From now on, the number "0" will be used to denote a balanced state, and "1" will be used to denote a unknown state with the property that if there are several "1"s in the distinguishers, they are of the same value.
For example, assume n = 8, and consider the following integral distinguisher D, B, D, D, B, D, D, B Then within the above notation, such distinguisher can be simply denoted as
where L C denotes that the left half is fixed to a constant, while R 3 represents that the third component of the right half of the input is active. The main convenience is to represent (D, B, D, D, B, D, D, B) simply by (1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0 ).
6-Round Integral Distinguishers
To confirm the existence of 6-round integral distinguisher of E when the linear transformation employs binary matrix, the following lemma is needed. Let's use X i,l to denote the l-th component of X i . The cases for Z 3 and Z 4 are a little involved, in fact, we can calculate them as follows:
is a variable in the j-th position of the right part of the input, and all c's are constants in F 2 d and they are not necessary to be identical. Assume the intermediate values after application of the non-linear transformations S in the (i + 1)-th round is
where
where K 2 ) = (c, . . . , c, s j (x ⊕ k 2,j ), c, . . . , c) (c, . . . , c, z 1,j , c, . . . , c) ,
and ⊕ k 3,j ), c, . . . , c) (c, . . . , c, z 2,j , c, . . . , c) .
Let [X] t represent the t-th component of X. Below will deal with the cases for Z 3 and Z 4 according to the value of p j,j .
The Case for Z 3 . If p j,j = 0, then according to Eq. (3), the t-th (1 ≤ t ≤ n) component of P (Z 1 ) ⊕ X 1 has the following form:
has the following form: 
where a · v i means the multiplication of the two binary variables, then based on the above lemma, the following theorem can be obtained.
Theorem 2. If the diffusion matrix of E is a binary invertible matrix P , then there always exists 6-round integral distinguisher in E of the following form:
where P T j denotes the transpose of P j .
Proof. Let the input of 6-round E be (X 0 , X 1 ) = ((c, c, . . . , c), (c, . . . , c, x, c, . . . , c) ), where the active position is j, then according to the encryption procedure, the l-th component of the left output, 1 ≤ l ≤ n , after 6 rounds is
Let's further divide the proof into the following two cases:
Case 1: p j,j = 0. In this situation, Lemma 1 tells that each component of Z 0 , Z 1 , Z 2 , Z 3 and Z 4 is balanced, thus X 6,l is balanced.
Case 2: p j,j = 1. In this situation, Lemma 1 shows that each component of Z 0 , Z 1 and Z 2 is balanced, and meanwhile, for 1 ≤ t ≤ n, t ̸ = j, Z 3,t and Z 4,t are also balanced. Thus ⊕
From the definition of P , p l,j = 0 will imply that for these positions l, X 6,l are balanced. Now the index 1 ≤ l ≤ n such that p l,j = 1 should be considered. In these situations, p l,j = 1, and Eq. (5) becomes ⊕
Thus, the sum of X 6,l are all equal to the sum of Z 4,j ⊕ Z 3,j . From the calculation of Z 4,j and Z 3,j as described in the proof of Lemma 7, the sum of Z 4,j ⊕ Z 3,j over x ∈ F 2 d is indeed only dependent on the constants of the inputs corresponding to the passive components and the unknown roundkeys. ⊓ ⊔
Impossible Dif ferentials
The matrix-based method has been utilized to find the impossible differentials of SPN ciphers [24] as well as Feistel ciphers with SP or SPS round function [43] . This technique concentrates on the property of the matrix in the diffusion layer, and can apply the theory of linear algebra to detect truncated impossible differentials. Motivated by this approach, in this subsection, we discuss how to characterize the impossible differentials of E. Remind that the diffusion matrix of E is P = (p i,j ) n×n and its inversion is P −1 = (q i,j ) n×n . As will be shown later, the process for finding impossible differentials of E resembles at a large extent the case of SPN ciphers, and all proofs of the proposed criteria are similar as that of [24] , thus the details are omitted. For consistency, we use the same notations as in [24] . Particulary, we use e j to denote an n-word state with the j-th position being non-zero and all other positions being zero.
Assume the input difference of E is (α, 0) with α ̸ = 0, then according to the encryption procedure, the output differences in the first h 1 rounds, where h 1 = 1, 2, 3, 4, can be described as
where ? denotes some unknown difference that is not considered by us. Similarly, assume the output difference of E is (β, β) with β ̸ = 0, then from the decryption direction, the output differences in the last h 2 rounds, where h 2 = 1, 2, 3, can be described as
The above two evolutional properties of the differences are very useful for our study on the impossible differentials of MISTY structure with SPN round function.
5-round Impossible Differentials
If we choose h 1 = 3 and h 2 = 2, and let α = e i , β = e j , then we can use the following equation
to present a criterion to characterize 5-round impossible differentials of E.
Proposition 3. If there exists a k
∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, such that H w (p k,i , q k,j ) = 1, then (e i , 0) (e j , e j ) is a 5-round impossible differential of E.
6-round Impossible Differentials
If we choose h 1 = 3 and h 2 = 3, and let α = e i , β = e j , then the following equation
could be used to analyze the case of 6-round impossible differentials of E. The criteria can be further divided into the following cases: 
. . , t v }, and
where each m b is the b-th column vector of 
where each m a (resp. m We remind here that, if α = e i , β = P (e j ), then Eq.(7) becomes the following
based on which, finding 6-round impossible differentials of the form (e i , e i ) (P (e j ), P (e j )) could be degenerated into the 5-round impossible differentials.
Proposition 7. If there exists a k
∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, such that H w (p k,i , q k,j ) = 1, then (e i , 0) (P (e j ), P (e j )) is a 6-round impossible differential of E.
7-Round Impossible Differentials
If we choose h 1 = 4 and h 2 = 3, then the following equation
which is equivalent to
could be used to analyze 7-round impossible differentials of E. Let α = e i and β = P (e j ), the 7-round case could be degenerated into the 6-round case as follow
based on which, we can obtain similar criteria as [24] but with slight modification.
where each m a denotes the a-th row vector of
. . , t v }, and
where each m a (resp. m 
) is a 7-round impossible differential of E.
Conclusion
This paper revisits the practical security evaluation of MISTY structure with SPN round function against linear cryptanalysis. We unify the lower bound of the number of active s-boxes for both differential and linear characteristics. This demonstrates a similar secure level for both MISTY structure and Feistel structure from the viewpoint of resisting DC and LC. Meanwhile, the resistance of MISTY structure with SPN round function against other kinds of cryptanalytic approaches such as integral and impossible differential cryptanalysis are also studied. The existence of 6-round integral distinguisher is confirmed when the diffusion layer employs a binary invertible matrix, and the criteria for characterizing 5/6/7-round impossible differentials are described. These results will benefit us to understand the security level of MISTY structure. 
A Distinguishing Properties of p-Camellia
A.1 Brief Description of p-Camellia
The block cipher p-Camellia 5 shares the same round function and the F L/F L −1 transformation as that of Camellia, except that the high-level structure is modified from Feistel to MISTY. One can refer Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 to compare the difference between Camellia and p-Camellia. The round function of p-Camellia (Camellia) is SPN type. It consists of three layers of operations: a round key addition layer, a substitution layer and a diffusion layer. The round key addition layer is defined by the XOR of the round-key and the input. The substitution layer is a non-linear bijective transformation S over F The diffusion layer which provides the avalanche effect employs an invertible linear transformation P defined over F 
6-round
A.2 Integral Distinguishers of Reduced-Round p-Camellia
We can apply the criterion from Section 4.2 to find the 6-round integral distinguishers of p-Camellia, all of which have been verified experimentally. accordingly, we obtain the same 6-round impossible differential (e 1 , 0) (e 1 , e 1 ).
6-round Integral Distinguishers of p-Camellia
7-round Impossible Differentials of p-Camellia
According to Proposition 8, 9, and 10, (e i , 0) (P (e j ), P (e j )) is a 7-round impossible differential of p-Camellia, where i, j are chosen from Table  4 and Table 5 .
